Frozen billions: a source of resources and political debate
The full-scale war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has been ongoing for more than three and a half years. During this time, the West has frozen a colossal volume of Russian state foreign currency reserves — about USD 300 billion.
Without exaggeration, this is the most effective Western sanction, as otherwise Russia could have used this money to wage war against Ukraine. Of this amount, over EUR 200 billion is held in European Union countries, with the remainder in G7 states such as the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States, as well as in Switzerland.
The largest portion of these assets is concentrated in Belgium: approximately EUR 190 billion of the Russian Central Bank’s assets — nearly two thirds of all frozen reserves — are held at the Brussels-based securities depository Euroclear. At the same time, these funds are not simply lying dormant. Financial institutions place them in risk-free deposits at central banks and receive interest income.
Due to high rates in recent years, the frozen Russian billions have generated significant excess profits. In 2023 alone, Euroclear earned about EUR 4.4 billion in interest on Russian assets, and in 2024 this amount grew to nearly EUR 7 billion. Formally, this income does not belong to Russia but to the financial intermediaries themselves, as sanctions prohibit transferring interest to the actual owner.
European countries support Ukraine by directing a significant part of the interest earned from the immobilised sovereign Russian assets to Kyiv. However, they also face their own economic difficulties and domestic political resistance, as taxpayers are unwilling to directly finance support for Ukraine. To reduce pressure on national budgets, more and more politicians are inclined to use frozen Russian sovereign assets as the main source of financing assistance for Ukraine. At the same time, EU countries justifiably avoid confiscating these assets, as such a step would inevitably lead to lawsuits from Russia — and the outcome of such cases is difficult to predict.
From interest to loans: the evolution of the Western approach
Throughout 2023–2024, Western states reached an understanding that at least the interest income from frozen reserves should be directed to support Ukraine. In October 2024, the G7 countries agreed on a joint mechanism — Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans (ERA-loans) — amounting to USD 50 billion.
Under this scheme, allies provide loans to Ukraine now (in total, under the ERA instrument, the Ministry of Finance has already raised EUR 14 billion from the European Union), and repayment will be made from future income generated by the placement of frozen Russian assets. The G7 established that this excess income is not part of the reserves themselves and therefore is not protected by Russia’s sovereign immunity. This opened the possibility of using it without violating international law.
The European Union soon introduced corresponding regulation: since early 2024, European depositories have been prohibited from disposing of the excess income independently, and the EU Council obtained the authority to direct part of these funds to support Ukraine. This compromise became the first practical step towards ensuring that frozen Russian assets begin to work to the benefit of the victim of aggression.
The reparation bonds mechanism: a creative alternative to confiscation
Despite the success in using interest, the question of the principal amount of frozen assets remained unresolved. Direct confiscation of Russian reserves faces legal obstacles, as a state’s sovereign funds are protected by international law. This is why in 2025 the EU began to consider a new idea — a reparation loan.
However, implementation of this idea is currently stalled: EU member states have not yet agreed on a single legal model. The most difficult aspect is the position of Belgium, where most of the assets are held. Prime Minister Bart De Wever publicly stated that he would support the plan only if there are clear legal guarantees of the scheme’s legality, collective risk-sharing between all EU member states, and the involvement of other G7 members. Brussels is wary of a situation in which sanctions are lifted, and Russia demands the return of reserves already used to support Ukraine. It should be noted that if one imagines being the head of the Belgian government acting in the interests of one’s own country, such a position is entirely understandable.
Most European countries — including Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Poland, and the Baltic states — support the creation of a reparation loan. At the October 2025 summit, EU leaders (with the exception of Hungary) agreed in principle that Russian assets must remain frozen until aggression ends and compensation is paid.
Russia is predictably reacting strongly negatively to these plans, calling them “theft” and “piracy.” It is preparing legal claims, but their chances of success are minimal. A consensus is emerging at the international level: a state that has launched aggression cannot count on the inviolability of its financial reserves.
Nevertheless, the EU continues to work on the technical parameters of a scheme that would allow unlocking financing without direct confiscation of assets. The concept is that the G7 and EU countries would sign an international agreement fixing the intention not to unfreeze Russian assets until compensation for damage caused to Ukraine is paid. Based on this agreement, a Ukraine Recovery Fund would be established, with member states and Ukraine itself as founders. Banks holding the frozen assets would issue bonds for the Fund in an amount equivalent to these assets, secured by them, and at a minimal interest rate — for example, 0.1% per annum — and provide these funds to Ukraine.
The resources received would be directed by the Fund to finance the recovery and development of the Ukrainian economy, acting as a coordinator and controller of the targeted use of funds. This approach resembles a modernised “Marshall Plan” that combines financial assistance with transparent oversight mechanisms.
The scheme would avoid what the “collective West” fears — Russian assets would not be confiscated, and there would be no formal link between them and the funds provided to the Fund, as the money is transferred to Ukraine through bonds issued by the banks holding the frozen Russian assets. Meanwhile, Ukraine could access the funds in a fairly short timeframe.
If Russia eventually agrees to pay reparations, these funds would be credited to the Fund’s account and directed towards repayment of the loans. If not, the loans effectively become perpetual, and the frozen assets gradually lose real value.
Reparation bonds as a preventive security mechanism
If the EUR 140 billion reparation loan plan is approved, Ukraine would receive approximately EUR 45 billion annually in 2026–2028. This is a significant sum, capable of covering a substantial portion of defence, social, and infrastructure needs.
However, if the direct loan mechanism does not work — and there are preconditions to believe this — attention should shift to the reparation bonds mechanism proposed in this article, which may have a better chance of implementation.
Still, the significance of providing funds to Ukraine goes far beyond financial calculations.
In fact, this could be the first case in which the international community compels an aggressor to pay during an ongoing war (unlike the situation when Iraq paid reparations to Kuwait — payments began only after the war ended). Reparation bonds transform frozen assets from an instrument of leverage into a source of accountability and justice.
If implemented, the mechanism may become not only a financial solution but also a strategic precedent that will reshape the international security architecture. It will demonstrate that no state can avoid punishment for aggression, and its currency reserves will no longer guarantee immunity. This is precisely how Europe can prevent new wars and stop Russia from further attacks on neighbouring countries.