As of the morning of April 13, it had already become clear in Hungary that the parliamentary elections had resulted in a historic defeat for Viktor Orbán: the opposition party Tisza, led by Péter Magyar, secured victory and, according to media and journalists’ estimates, won around 138 out of 199 seats—thus achieving a constitutional majority. Orbán himself conceded defeat. Voter turnout was record-high, at approximately 79–80%.
On the website of Hungary’s election authority (NVI), Tisza was already listed in the morning as the leading force by party lists: 3,102,831 votes, or 53.06%, and 45 seats from party lists. The third force, Mi Hazánk, received 5.83% and 6 seats from party lists.
“The new leader of Hungarian politics, Péter Magyar, ran his campaign on slogans of fighting corruption, unblocking EU funds, and returning Hungary to the European mainstream. These themes became the core of his political offer and made it possible to turn the elections not simply into a change of parties, but into a vote for a new course of the state. In this sense, the elections effectively became a referendum on Hungary’s foreign policy direction: continuing confrontation with the EU, a policy of vetoes and semi-isolation—or a return to democratic Europe, restoration of trust in Budapest, and strengthening the country’s role within the EU and NATO,” believes Alona Lebedieva, owner of the Ukrainian industrial and investment group Aurum Group.
Magyar’s campaign explicitly framed this choice as a crossroads between “East and West,” and the voting results clearly demonstrated that a significant part of Hungarian society supported a European turn.
Hungary’s economic situation significantly weakened Orbán’s position. Ahead of the elections, media outlets pointed to a near-stagnant economy, years of weak growth dynamics, a budget deficit exceeding 5% of GDP, and growing voter fatigue due to declining living standards.
“Against this backdrop, a key argument of the opposition was that the country had lost significant volumes of EU funding due to rule-of-law and corruption issues: various estimates suggested around €17–18 billion in frozen funds, including more than €6.4 billion under the recovery mechanism alone. Orbán’s party attempted to explain the crisis through external factors, including Russia’s war against Ukraine, energy issues, and the risk of ‘being drawn into the war,’” Lebedieva emphasizes.
At the same time, voters increasingly responded not to such rhetoric, but to stagnation, inflationary pressure, the state of healthcare, transport, and a general sense of exhaustion with the model Orbán had been building for sixteen years.
Orbán’s defeat can also be seen as a political blow to Donald Trump, who openly supported him during the campaign. According to media assessments, Orbán was one of Trump’s key allies in Europe, and his defeat is already being interpreted as a signal for U.S. politics ahead of the congressional elections this November. Therefore, the result in Hungary objectively strengthens the EU’s position in its ideological and political confrontation with the Trump-aligned camp. It cannot be ruled out that, at least for some time, open support from Trump for European politicians may work against them rather than in their favor—especially in societies fatigued by confrontation, isolationism, and pro-Russian sympathies. Hungary’s result is already being perceived as a blow to a broader circle of right-wing populist alliances in Europe.
“The position of Hungary’s future government toward Ukraine is not unambiguous and is not automatically pro-Ukrainian. The Tisza program does not support Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU, proposes putting the issue of Ukraine’s membership to a mandatory referendum, and also предусматривает that Hungary will not send troops or weapons to Ukraine,” notes Alona Lebedieva.
At the same time, the fundamental difference from Orbán lies elsewhere. The blocking of EU decisions regarding Ukraine, conflict with Brussels, and a demonstratively pro-Russian style were among the defining features of his course. According to journalists and analysts, Tisza’s victory may ease tensions between Budapest and the EU and reduce Hungary’s obstruction of decisions regarding Ukraine, particularly around major European aid packages to Kyiv.
“Thus, Hungary will not become an automatic ally of Ukraine, but it may well cease to be the main blocker of European policy toward it,” Lebedieva suggests.
Following this vote, Hungary is entering a phase of forming a new government. International partners are already congratulating Magyar on his victory, while financial markets are pricing in expectations of a relatively smooth transition and a gradual reset of Budapest’s relations with the EU. The key question for the coming weeks is how quickly the new majority will be able to move from symbolic victory to real changes in governance, institutions, media, and relations with Brussels.