The suspension of the maritime corridor means not only a loss of $2.7–3.3 billion in export revenues in the second half of the year. By autumn, the shortage of storage capacity could reach 7–11 million tonnes. This is no longer merely a logistics issue: it is working capital frozen ahead of the next sowing campaign. That is why the risk extends beyond lower export revenues — it spills over into currency, fiscal, and production risks.
Over the years of the full-scale war, the Ukrainian economy has learned to restructure routes and move cargo through the western border. But there is no quick or full substitute for maritime exports. Since the Ukrainian maritime corridor began operating in 2023, around 200 million tonnes of cargo have been transported through it, including 118 million tonnes of grain. It is part of the country’s economic infrastructure, not merely one of several equivalent routes.
Key Scenario Estimates
(stable navigation through the ports of Greater Odesa does not resume until the end of 2026, while alternative routes expand gradually)
These are scenario-based estimates under conditions of high uncertainty. What matters more than the figures themselves are the channels through which the suspension of maritime exports affects the economy.
Alternatives Exist. A Full Substitute Does Not
The arithmetic appears manageable: 6 million tonnes by sea versus 4.5 million tonnes of potential capacity through the Danube, rail, and road transport. But potential throughput and actual exports are two different things. During the first half of August, alternative routes covered only around one-third of the required agricultural export flow.
Land-based and Danube logistics are more expensive, more complex, and require time to scale up. The ability to physically transport cargo does not mean it can be done with the same economics per tonne.
For the mining and metals sector, this is critical. A high transport component directly puts pressure on the profitability of metals and iron ore. For grain, the issue is different: physically, the commodity can be stored, but every month of delay consumes the producer’s working capital.
$3 Billion Means Not Just Less Foreign Currency, but a Different Timing of Its Inflow
Agricultural export revenues not received today will not necessarily disappear permanently. Grain can be sold later, while changes in global prices may partially compensate for lower volumes. For the economy, however, what matters is not only the final amount, but also when the money arrives.
If foreign currency does not enter the country now, supply in the domestic foreign exchange market narrows, and the gap has to be covered by larger interventions from the National Bank of Ukraine. With sufficient reserves, this can restrain sharp exchange-rate fluctuations, but it increases pressure on reserves and contributes to depreciation pressure.
For businesses, the delay has a separate cost. Until the products are sold, companies do not receive working capital, while they still have to pay wages, service loans, buy fuel, cover storage costs, and prepare for the next production cycle.
The Budget Will Feel the Impact with a Lag
The fiscal effect should not be calculated simply as a share of lost export revenues. Exports are subject to a zero VAT rate, meaning that lower exports also result in lower VAT refunds, which partially mitigates the impact.
The main losses come through lower corporate profits and an overall decline in economic activity: corporate income tax, personal income tax, the military levy, local taxes, payments by port and state-owned companies, and weaker import VAT revenues.
Over the first seven months of 2026, corporate income tax generated around UAH 193 billion. If a scenario-based decline in the relevant revenues of approximately 10% of the average monthly level is assumed, this channel alone could cost around UAH 16.6 billion over six months. A significant part of the effect will become visible only in early 2027 because of the tax payment calendar.
Taking into account other channels and the reduction in VAT refunds, the “net” negative impact on the budget can be estimated at UAH 20–24 billion. Separately, the aforementioned UAH 25–27 billion would be required for port restoration, insurance guarantees, storage, and support for more expensive logistics.
The Biggest Risk Is Not in Export Statistics
When it comes to GDP, simply subtracting lost export revenues does not work. Harvested but unexported crops may be recorded as an increase in inventories. Weaker imports partially offset the deterioration in net exports.
The actual losses occur through other channels. Excess grain puts pressure on domestic purchase prices. Farmers pay for storage. Metallurgical companies face higher transportation costs. More expensive imported fuel, raw materials, and components increase production costs. Taken together, these effects provide grounds for estimating a reduction of around 0.9–1.1 percentage points in real GDP growth.
The most dangerous consequences will emerge with a delay. Due to the slowdown in exports, the shortage of storage capacity could reach 7–11 million tonnes by autumn. Public government estimates refer not only to storage facilities, but also to the financial resilience of farmers and the next sowing campaign.
Ten million tonnes of unsold products are not simply “grain in storage” in statistical terms. They represent capital needed to purchase seeds, fertilisers, fuel, and other resources for the next season. A logistics problem in the second half of 2026 could therefore become a production problem in 2027.
What Makes the Scenario Manageable
The balance over the coming months will depend on whether the Danube and railways can consistently handle the increased load. If they can, Ukraine will have an expensive but manageable option: part of the products will be redirected, while another part will be stored and sold after maritime exports resume. If actual throughput proves lower than expected, the effects will begin to reinforce one another: stock accumulation will push down domestic prices, more expensive logistics will reduce profits, and lower profits will mean both lower tax revenues and less working capital.
Three practical priorities follow directly from this.
First, the priority is not to replace all 6 million tonnes at any cost, but to preserve viable per-tonne economics for the mining and metals sector and prevent farmers from losing the working capital they need for the next sowing campaign.
Second, the Danube and railways must operate as managed, albeit more expensive, routes rather than as channels for uncontrolled overload. Otherwise, the transport component will erode profitability faster than additional volumes can be exported.
Third, the focus should not be only on revenues, but also on exporters’ cash-flow gaps — wages, loans, storage, and preparations for the next production cycle. It is precisely this gap that will affect 2027.
Ukraine is not restructuring its logistics for the first time. This time, the key question is not how many millions of tonnes can be diverted away from the sea. What matters far more is the cost of doing so and whether businesses will retain enough resources to produce and export again next year.
Author: Alona Lebedieva, owner of Aurum Group, a Ukrainian diversified industrial and investment group of companies