The opening of the first negotiating cluster on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is an important political step. However, it should not be perceived as an automatic acceleration of the entire process.
According to Alona Lebedieva, owner of Aurum Group, a diversified Ukrainian industrial and investment group, Ukraine is entering a much more complex phase, in which every political agreement must be translated into laws, secondary legislation, procedures and the real work of state institutions.
On 12 June, the EU announced that member states had agreed to open the first negotiating cluster for Ukraine and Moldova, and on 15 June, at the Second Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg, negotiations under Cluster 1 were officially launched. This is the fundamental cluster – “Fundamentals”. It includes five negotiating chapters: judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; public procurement; statistics; and financial control. More broadly, this cluster also covers the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform and economic criteria.
At first glance, this may look like a technical stage. But it is precisely this cluster that contains the most sensitive issues for the Ukrainian state. This is not about a separate sectoral reform, but about the system’s ability to operate according to EU rules: how decisions are made, how funds are controlled, how procurement is conducted, how the judiciary functions, how the state guarantees citizens’ rights, and how it provides data that European institutions can trust.
The formal opening of the cluster does not yet mean it will be closed quickly. For Cluster 1, the EU has already defined interim benchmarks for the horizontal level and Chapters 23 and 24, as well as closing benchmarks for Chapters 5, 18 and 32 – public procurement, statistics and financial control. This is similar to regular work with the IMF: it is not enough to make a promise once; implementation must be demonstrated continuously.
One of the most difficult areas is statistics. For the EU, the quality of statistics is not a formality, but the foundation of governance. Ukraine must transition to the methodology of the European System of Accounts in a way that allows Eurostat to verify Ukrainian data. Data on gross national income already partly complies with ESA 2010 standards, but Ukraine still has to ensure the full transmission of the necessary data to Eurostat. Without this, it is impossible to properly assess the economy, the budget, the labour market, social policy, regional development and reconstruction needs.
Another major area is public procurement. Ukraine must align its legislation with EU rules in the fields of public procurement, concessions, public-private partnerships and related procedures. The first step has already been taken: Draft Law No. 11520 “On Public Procurement” was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 27 May and returned with the signature of the President of Ukraine on 23 June. But the law itself is only the beginning.
In the coming years, the government will have to prepare a large number of by-laws, instructions, standard contracts and training materials. It will also be necessary to introduce a risk-based approach at the early stages of tenders in sectors with the highest corruption risks – including defence, energy and reconstruction.
Alona Lebedieva notes that this is critical for Ukraine not only in terms of formally fulfilling EU requirements, but also in terms of future trust in the reconstruction process. A significant share of funds for infrastructure recovery will pass through procurement, concessions and public-private partnerships. If these procedures remain opaque or overly dependent on discretionary decisions, this will become a problem not only for Brussels, but also for investors. Private capital does not enter an environment where the rules for selecting partners are unclear or constantly changing.
A separate issue is the appeal of tenders before the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine and the selection of private partners in PPP projects. This will be especially relevant for infrastructure reconstruction, where competition, transparency and clear procedures must be not a declaration, but a condition for access to major projects.
Financial control will also be one of the markers of trust. Ukraine must strengthen the role and independence of the Accounting Chamber in line with INTOSAI standards and IFPP principles. For partners, this is a matter of principle, as Ukraine receives substantial international support, and scrutiny over the use of these funds will only increase.
The judiciary and justice block will be no less complex. This includes the creation of a new administrative court with judges selected with the participation of independent international experts, improvements to the system for asset recovery and management, reform of ARMA, and a broader strengthening of trust in the judicial system. These are reforms that are difficult to implement quickly because they affect interests within the state system itself.
The opening of the first negotiating cluster, “Fundamentals”, has not only practical but also symbolic significance. It confirmed that the EU enlargement process continues even amid the war in Europe. For Ukraine, this is an important signal: European integration remains not a declaration of support, but a real negotiating process with specific stages, criteria and obligations.
At the same time, the opening of just one cluster should not become an end in itself. Ukraine and the European Commission are ready to move forward, so it would be logical to open other negotiating clusters in the coming months. This would help maintain the pace of negotiations, prevent the process from turning into a slow bureaucratic procedure, and confirm the seriousness of the EU’s intentions regarding Ukraine’s future membership.
According to Alona Lebedieva, it is crucial now not to lose momentum. EU accession will depend not only on diplomacy, but also on the quality of draft legislation, the work of the parliamentary majority, the government’s ability to explain difficult decisions to society, and the state’s readiness to act not in a mode of emergency response, but systematically.
For business and investors, all of this also matters. European integration is not only about future access to the EU market. It is also about predictable courts, transparent procurement, high-quality statistics, financial control, clear PPP rules and a lower cost of risk for capital. If Ukraine is able to meet these conditions not formally, but in substance, it will become much more understandable for long-term investment.
However, if the process gets bogged down in bureaucratic delays, formal compliance with requirements and rushed legislation, this could push back the timeline for accession. Even if some reforms move forward on schedule, weak institutional preparation can slow down the closure of the cluster and affect the entire negotiation calendar.
The opening of the first cluster is an important step. But it also shows that the stage of symbolic support for Ukraine is gradually coming to an end. A stage of testing the state’s capacity is beginning. And this is where, Alona Lebedieva concludes, it will become clear whether Ukraine can not only politically aspire to the EU, but also technically, legally and institutionally withstand the pace of European integration.