In Central Asia, railway policy is increasingly moving beyond infrastructure alone – it is shifting into the realm of foreign policy and geoeconomics. One of the most interesting directions here is the southern vector through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which is no longer merely a distant idea and is appearing ever more frequently in official talks as part of the region’s future transport architecture. As of early April 2026, this is no longer just an expert discussion, but a topic being advanced at the level of presidents and governments.
“We are effectively seeing transport in Central Asia becoming an instrument of foreign policy, and this is about influence and access to markets,” notes Alona Lebedieva, owner of the Ukrainian diversified industrial and investment group Aurum Group.
For Uzbekistan, this route has long held strategic importance, but recently it has received fresh political momentum. In November 2025, the country’s president named the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Trans-Afghan transport corridor among the priority projects of interregional connectivity, also proposing the creation of a separate infrastructure council at the level of deputy prime ministers. At this same level, the Uzbek side is explicitly articulating the ambition to turn Central Asia into one of the global centers of trade. In other words, this is no longer only about logistics, but about changing the economic role of the region.
In 2026, this logic received practical continuation in bilateral work with Pakistan: on February 5, following talks between Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the country’s prime minister, the importance of accelerating the implementation of the Trans-Afghan railway construction project, as well as developing the Pakistan–China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan link, was emphasized. This shows that Tashkent is already thinking in terms of a comprehensive system of routes that is meant to provide the country with access in the southern direction while at the same time strengthening its role in a broader regional hub. The project in question involves a railway of about 573–647 km, with a preliminary cost of roughly $4.6–4.8 billion and a potential freight capacity of up to 20 million tons per year.
This is precisely where an important structural point emerges: such external activity is not isolated. It is directly supported by the internal transformation of the sector, because railway reform in Uzbekistan – involving private capital, a change in the management model, and greater efficiency – is effectively creating the conditions for the country not only to use routes, but to participate in shaping them.
Kazakhstan, for its part, is also becoming increasingly active within this logic. On February 4, 2026, after talks with Pakistan’s prime minister, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that the sides had discussed the development of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, transit routes through Afghanistan, the possibilities of the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, as well as the prospects of a railway project along the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan route. This means that Astana is already viewing the southern direction not as a separate Uzbek project, but as part of its own strategy for access to new markets and maritime outlets.
“And this is not a competition of routes, but the shaping of a new transport map in which the countries of Central Asia are trying to control their own access to the sea,” Alona Lebedieva emphasizes.
In such a configuration, the issue goes far beyond the story of just another railway, because what is at stake is a change in the geoeconomic logic of the region: if the southern route becomes operational, Central Asia will gain more direct access to the ports of South Asia, while Afghanistan in this scheme will gradually be transformed from a risk factor into a transit link. Moreover, official Uzbek wording directly points to an attempt to connect Central and South Asia and to integrate Afghanistan into regional economic processes.
This transformation is already being reinforced by the economic dynamics of cooperation. In 2025, Afghanistan rose from sixth to second place among Uzbekistan’s trading partners, overtaking China, which had previously held that position.
The total volume of trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan in 2025 reached about $1.6 billion, of which more than $1.5 billion was Uzbek exports.
In effect, Uzbekistan is becoming a “window to the world” for Afghan business, while business forums with the participation of Afghan companies are regularly held in Samarkand.
On March 6, 2026, the agreement on preferential trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, originally signed in June 2025, was ratified, creating an additional basis for the growth of trade turnover. At the same time, the energy track is also developing: the parties agreed on electricity supplies and the construction of the relevant infrastructure, with Uzbekistan acting as the key contractor.
This is not only about trade, but about actual economic integration: from the first quarter of 2027, Afghanistan may receive between 800 and 1,000 MW of electricity, while the country’s own generation remains limited. At the same time, Afghanistan is one of the key buyers of Uzbek flour produced from Kazakh wheat, which further links the economies of the three countries into a single chain.
At the same time, this route is not being considered in isolation: in presidential and governmental statements, it is increasingly being linked with the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and Trans-Caspian routes. In other words, what is taking shape is not one corridor, but a multi-vector transport map in which Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are gradually moving from the role of participants to the role of co-architects of regional connectivity.
“In effect, we are seeing a transition from participation to design – Central Asia is beginning to define for itself what its place in global logistics will look like,” Alona Lebedieva concludes.